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Evolution of Cooperation on Playing Prisoner's Dilemma Game in the Finite-Capacity Spot

Hiroshi Toyoizumi¹

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1. Waseda University, Graduate school of accounting

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Date:

Received 16 April 2009 06:44 UTC; Posted 16 April 2009

Subjects:

Evolutionary Biology

Tags:

• Evolution
• cooperation

Abstract:

Explaining the evolution of cooperative behavior has been one of main challenges in evo- lutionary theory^1-6. Cooperation may collapse a surge of defectors who enjoy the benefit without cooperation in situation called prisoner’s dilemma. In the concept of evolutionary game theory, there are many proposals to explain the evolution of cooperation by adding further mechanism such as, kin selection¹, reciprocity⁷, punishment^8,9 and the finiteness of the population⁶. In evolutionary game theory, a pair is randomly picked from population, and play a prisoner’s dilemma game. Here we also show the finiteness encourages cooperation but use different approach: in spite of random-pick, individuals join and leave a spot or territory with a limited capacity to form a pair and play prisoner’s dilemma game during their stay in the spot. We use a simple finite-state continuous-time Markov chain to analyze the dynamics in the spot and find that, given large cooperation benefit, just leaving together from the spot is enough for cooperation to be emerged. Further, we show that the coexistence of cooperators and defectors may become stable in highly congested spots.

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This document is licensed to the public under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License

How to cite this document:

Toyoizumi, Hiroshi. Evolution of Cooperation on Playing Prisoner's Dilemma Game in the Finite-Capacity Spot. Available from Nature Precedings <http://hdl.handle.net/10101/npre.2009.3071.1> (2009)

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